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In health  care  the  assessment  of  patients’  needs  is  typically  entrusted  to health  care  providers.  By  contrast,
in publicly  financed  long-term  care  (LTC)  needs  assessment  is often  delegated  to an  independent  assessor.
One rationale  offered  for  independent  needs  assessment  in  LTC  is to limit  the  scope  for moral  hazard  and
supplier-induced  demand,  which  may be particularly  strong  in  case  of public  LTC  insurance.  We  study
whether  independent  needs  assessment  restricts  use  of  publicly  financed  LTC  at  the  intensive  margin
(i.e.  after  people  are  being  assessed  to be  eligible  for  receiving  care).  Therefore,  we  link nationwide  Dutch
administrative  datasets  about  individual  LTC  use  and  eligibility  decisions  by the  independent  assessment
agency  in  2012.  We  find  for virtually  all types  of  care,  all  population  subgroups,  and  all  regions  that  LTCMoral hazard use  by patients  was substantially  less  than  the maximum  amount  of  care  allowed  by the  independent
assessor.  This  suggests  that  in  the  Netherlands  independent  needs  assessment  in  LTC  does  not  impose  a
binding  constraint  on  use  once  a person  is  considered  eligible  for  care.  Still,  independent  needs  assessment
may  have  reduced  LTC  use  at the  extensive  margin.  A significant  proportion  of the  applications  for  care
(16  %)  was rejected.  In addition,  the  independent  assessment  may  deter  some  people  from  applying.
© 2020  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY license
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l1. Introduction
Traditionally, the needs of patients are assessed by their health
care providers. But these providers may  be self-interested and have
superior information about patients’ needs, resulting in principal-
agent problems for the patient and the third-party payer [1]. In
the presence of comprehensive health insurance, this may  result in
moral hazard and supplier-induced demand.
Independent needs assessment may  be especially popular in the
presence of public long-term care (LTC) financing because moral
hazard and supplier-induced demand are particularly likely in this
context. LTC enables the elderly and the disabled to cope with their
limitations. Receiving more care and support than strictly needed
is likely to generate positive marginal benefits for patients because
it is offering additional comfort. Moreover, if LTC providers are
paid fee-for-service and are allowed to perform needs assessment
themselves, they may  be inclined to induce more demand for their
services than strictly necessary. Hence, if due to the presence of
comprehensive LTC insurance the marginal costs for patients are
∗ Corresponding author at: PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
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ow, the risk of moral hazard and supplier-induced demand may
e particularly high for LTC services.
These problems may  be reduced by delegating the assessment
f patients’ needs to an independent assessor. Independent needs
ssessment is uncommon in health care, but frequently used in LTC,
articularly in countries with a comprehensive public LTC financing
cheme, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Norway
nd Switzerland [2–5].
We will examine whether independent needs assessment is
ndeed likely to constrain LTC demand in the context of the Dutch
ublic LTC insurance scheme. Independent needs assessment has
wo  roles. First, it determines whether a person is eligible (the
xtensive margin). Second, conditional on being eligible the asses-
or restricts the use of care by specifying a maximum amount of
are (the intensive margin). In this paper we  study the intensive
argin, i.e. does the maximum amount of care set by the assessor
imit the amount of care used by people? We  are able to study this
ecause the assessment only limits use if the actual care used by
eople is close to the maximum amount of care set by the assessor.
f this maximum is not binding, implying that most people use less
are than they are entitled to, then it is unlikely that this restriction
imits demand. By contrast, if most eligible people use the max-
mum admitted amount of care, this implies that the restriction
s binding and it may  indeed have served as a demand constraint.
 under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The Dutch institutional setting allows us to study this phenomenon
with precision because both the eligibility decision by the assessor
and the actual use of LTC are administered for each patient and can
be linked at the individual level.
We use these nationwide data to examine whether the amount
of home care used by a patient equals the maximum admitted
amount by the independent agency. We find for virtually all types
of care, all population subgroups, and all regions that LTC use by
patients was substantially less than the maximum amount of care
admitted by the independent assessor. This suggests that in the
Dutch context at the intensive margin independent needs assess-
ment in LTC hardly limits LTC use. Due to a lack of data we  leave
for future research whether independent needs assessment may
have reduced LTC use at the extensive margin. In 2009 a significant
proportion of the applications for care (16 %) were rejected by the
assessment agency [6]. Rejections occur because the applicant does
not fulfill the eligibility requirements or quits the assessment pro-
cedure, or because the assessor refers the applicant to care financed
through other financing schemes.
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, to our
knowledge it is the first study that analyzes the role of an inde-
pendent needs assessor in rationing access to care in detail using
quantitative data. Second, using population data at the individual
level, our study is the first to analyze the non-take-up, i.e. the max-
imum amount of care admitted by the assessor minus the actual
use of care by the patient. Our paper therefore contributes to the
understanding of non-take-up of health insurance benefits and its
determinants (see e.g. [7,8]). Our paper is organized as follows. First,
we discuss the rationale for independent needs assessment. Next,
we briefly describe the Dutch context of public LTC insurance. Then
we explain how we analyze the potential impact of the assessment
agency on constraining LTC use, followed by a presentation and
discussion of the empirical results.
2. Rationale for independent needs assessment
The choice for independent needs assessment in health care
depends on whether its potential benefits outweigh its potential
costs. The main benefit is that it reduces potential bias in the assess-
ment resulting from provider interests or patient demand. When
providers and recipients have an interest in providing or obtaining
more or more expensive care than strictly needed, independent
needs assessment may  reduce overprovision and inefficiently high
expenditures. This effect may  be amplified if insurance reduces the
marginal cost of consuming LTC for the recipient. These potential
benefits, however, have to be weighed against the monetary costs
of assessments and auditing as well as the time costs involved.
In addition, the independent assessor may  also be biased due to
pressure by stakeholders, financial restrictions or regulations, and
may  be less able to make an appropriate needs assessment because
the assessor may  be less informed about the specific needs of the
patient than a provider due to a less personal and frequent contact
with the patient.
The choice for an independent assessment or an assessment
done by a provider depends on the characteristics of the health
care that the assessment is needed for and on other factors. At least
five factors can be distinguished that are relevant for determining
the feasibility and desirability of independent needs assessment.
First, since independent assessment takes time, it is only possi-
ble when care is not urgent (i.e. for elective care). Second, if the
need for care cannot be defined precisely there is more room for
moral hazard and inducing demand, in which case the bias in the
providers’ decisions may  be larger. An independent assessor may
create more transparency and equity in the eligibility criteria for
obtaining care. Third, an independent assessor is more attractive
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f there are benefits from overuse for providers and patients, e.g.
nder fee-for-service contracts, positive marginal benefits for the
atient from overuse and the government or an insurer pays a large
hare of the costs. Fourth, an independent assessor is less beneficial
f there are other restrictions on supply (e.g. provider budgets) and
emand (e.g. co-payments) as these restrictions also work to limit
upplier-induced demand and moral hazard. Fifth, the value of an
ndependent assessment is higher when the assessor has the abil-
ty and the incentives to act in the interest of its principal. External
ressure e.g. because applicants may  challenge eligibility decisions
n court, may  cause a rational independent assessor to be more
enient than its principal desires [9].
These five factors mean that independent needs assessment in
he context of LTC is feasible, because LTC is often for persisting
ather than urgent problems, and that is desirable because there is
ikely much room for moral hazard and supplier induced demand.
here are two  reasons for this. First, the demand for LTC is not
nly a function of someone’s functional limitations, but perceptions
nd personal circumstances, e.g. the availability of informal sup-
ort, matter too. Hence, the need for care often cannot be defined
recisely. Second, in the case of LTC insurance, services for which
arginal costs are higher than the benefits for society or the third-
arty payer may  be welfare-increasing for individual providers and
atients.
. Long-term care in the Netherlands
Public LTC insurance pays for 94 % (2012 figure) of all LTC expen-
itures in the Netherlands; the remainder is financed through the
ocial Support Act [10]. People who  are eligible for public LTC insur-
nce benefits can choose between receiving these services in kind
r to take out a cash benefit that is equal to roughly 75 % of the costs
f the care were provided in kind [11].
Until 1998, LTC providers were responsible for the assessments
f people’s needs for care covered by the public LTC insurance
cheme. To reduce the influence of providers on LTC use, in 1998
his task was entrusted to regional independent assessment agen-
ies. In 2005, all regional assessment agencies were merged into a
entral agency for needs assessment (CIZ) to reduce the prevailing
egional variation in needs assessment. Since then CIZ has carried
ut or audited the needs assessment for public LTC insurance ben-
fits. It does so according to rules set by the Ministry of Health
12,13].
Eligibility for LTC covered through public LTC insurance is
sually requested by the applicant or someone who does the
pplication on their behalf. Eligibility depends on the health and
ealth-related limitations of the applicant. Until 2015, many other
spects such as living conditions, social environment, psychic and
ocial functioning of the applicant, the presence of other profes-
ional services and informal care that the patient receives were
lso taken into account [14–16]. To get insight in these aspects of
he application, the assessor uses the information provided on the
pplication form and may  gather information on the criteria listed
bout, e.g. via health care providers or through a home visit. In some
ases (e.g. after a hospitalization) in which the need for home care
s straightforward to establish, the assessment is sometimes dele-
ated to a home care provider. In these cases, CIZ has the role of an
uditor [13].
Home care providers are private entities, which are either for-
rofit or not-for-profit [11]. Home care providers are paid for every
our of care provided. These fee-for-service contracts mean that
hey have incentives for overprovision. The providers are con-
racted by regional single payers, each of which is constrained by
n annual budget that is set at the national level. Regional payers do
ot bear any financial risk for LTC expenses and do not compete for
 IN PRESSG Model
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Table 1
Eligibility for home care and use of care in kind in 2012, unique individuals.
Number % care in kinda % cash benefit % no care
Type of home care
Personal care 404,508 79.3 14.3 6.4
Nursing 187,823 81.4 10.0 8.6
Individual assistance 194,533 58.7 32.2 9.1
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consumers, and therefore have little incentive to monitor the effi-
ciency of care. The regional provider budgets, however, may  limit
LTC use because they constrain the total amount spent on LTC. Non-
public data from the Dutch Health Care Authority show that from
2011 to 2013 all 32 single payers spent at least 98.3 % of the regional
budget per year, which suggest that the regional budgets may  act
as a demand constraint. Nevertheless, only a few individuals were
on waiting lists during the period (2012) we studied [17].
In addition to regional budgets, income-related co-payments
may  also restrict publicly financed LTC demand, although Dutch
co-payments are relatively low in comparison to other countries
[2,18].
The key question addressed in this paper is whether inde-
pendent needs assessment effectively restricts publicly financed
LTC demand at the intensive margin in the presence of other
potential demand constraints (i.e. regional providers budgets and
co-payments).
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Methods and data
At the intensive margin the assessor can reduce LTC demand
for each of the types of LTC that is used. In home care the assessor
specifies a range of hours to each client. This range contains a lower
and an upper bound of hours care per week. The upper bound is the
maximum admitted amount of publicly financed care the client is
allowed to receive. If clients use less hours of care, then the maxi-
mum  admitted amount then we conclude that the assessment does
not limit LTC use.
To investigate this, we use a nationwide administrative dataset
that encompasses about 600,000 individuals being eligible for
receiving home care in the Netherlands for 13 four-week peri-
ods in 2012. We  link three sets information at the individual level
through a unique person ID created by Statistics Netherlands. The
first dataset contains the eligibility decisions made by the indepen-
dent assessor (CIZ). These decisions specify for which types and
amounts (in hours) of home care the individual is eligible for. We
study four types of home care: personal care, nursing, group assis-
tance and individual assistance. The second dataset records the
4
c
Table 2
Use of personal care conditional on eligibility in 2012.
n (% of total)b % who  use care in kind c Median
Eligibility (hours per week)a
0−2 622,261 (18.3 %) 61.0 % 1.0 
2−4  957,594 (28.1 %) 64.3 % 2.3 
4−7  934,245 (27.4 %) 71.2 % 4.0 
7−10  423,490 (12.4 %) 74.7 % 6.3 
10−13  179,077 (5.3 %) 71.6 % 8.8 
13−16  106,154 (3.1 %) 64.8 % 11.3 
16−20  57,818 (1.7 %) 58.9 % 14.6 
20−25  112,454 (3.3 %) 70.0 % 16.6 
>  25 14,486 (0.4 %) 28.2 % 23.2 
Note: results for other types of home care are available upon request.
a Categories of hours the client is eligible for. If the individual changed from one catego
category.
b n refers to number of observations in a category where every observation is for a four-
represents the share: the number of observations per category divided by all observation
c The percentages in this table are calculated using monthly observations. Hence, they a
the  entire year.
d Individuals who used at least some care provided in kind only.
e Refers to the number of observations where clients have take-up shares between 90
maximum admitted amount of hours is 16 h per four week-period (category 2−4) we  calc
clients  use 15 and 16 h, and 60 % of the observations where clients use 14 h, and divide it 
no  fixed maximum admitted amount of hours.
f Number of observations where clients use more than 100 % of the maximum admitted
category  there is no fixed maximum admitted amount of hours.
3Group assistance 106,934 62.6 24.9 12.5
a CBS (2018) [19].
ctual use of care. This data comes from the Central Administration
ffice (CAK) of the public LTC insurance scheme. It contains the
umber of hours of home care that was provided in-kind as it was
illed by the providers. Third, we  link background characteristics
rom other administrative sources. These background character-
stics are the age, gender, the region of residence, the household
omposition, household income and prior health care expenditures
f all users.
About two-thirds of the individuals who are eligible for home
are are elderly who either have a somatic or a psychogeriatric con-
ition that causes functional limitations requiring home care. The
ther individuals are young disabled who have a psychiatric disor-
er, or a sensory, physical or mental handicap. Of all individuals, 55
ercent lives with a spouse or a child while 45 percent lives alone;
8 percent is female. Finally, the eligible population is rather poor
n average: more than half is in the first three income deciles [19].
We analyze if the restrictions that are imposed by indepen-
ent assessors limit their use by calculating the take-up ratio: the
mount of care that a person used divided by the amount that this
erson was  eligible for. If this take-up ratio is lower than 1, the
estrictions that the independent assessor imposed were not bind-
ng for this person. We  calculate this ratio for each type of home
are. Subsequently, we use ordinary least squares regressions to
egress the take-up ratio on background characteristics to find out
f the ratio varies systematically across subgroups in the population..2. Results
LTC use is in most cases lower than the maximum amount of
are as admitted by the assessor. As shown in Table 1, a substantial
 number of hours used (%)d Take-up share between Take-up share > 100%f
90 %–100 % e
18.2% 3.3 %
17.6% 4.0 %
10.9% 3.0 %
14.0 % 3.2 %
16.1% 4.1 %
18.3 % 4.7 %
19.2% 3.8 %
20.2% 4.7 %
– –
ry to another during a four-week period, the individual is assigned to the highest
week period, hence there are 13 periods in 2012. The percentage between brackets
s for this type of care.
re all lower than the average reported in Table 1 (79.3 %), which is calculated over
 %–100 % of the maximum admitted amount of eligible hours. For example, if the
ulated the take-up share between 90–100 % as the number of observations where
by the total number of observations for that category. For the last category there is
 amount of eligible hours divided by the total number of observations. For the last
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Fig. 1. Use of personal care by individuals eligible for 0 to 8 h (upper left), 8-16 h (upper right), 16-28 h (lower left) and 28-40 h (right) per four-week period.
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calculated using all observations of individuals who used some care that was prov
four-week period and for other types of home care are available upon request.
share of the eligible individuals does not use LTC at all, varying from
6.4 percent for personal care to 12.5 percent for group assistance.
Furthermore, a small group opts for a cash benefit while the largest
group uses care that is provided in kind at some point during the
year (see Table 1).
Of the individuals using care in kind at some point, only very few
individuals take up an amount of care that is close to the maximum
amount they are eligible for. This is illustrated for personal care
in Table 2 and Fig. 1. For example, as shown in Fig. 1 (lower right
panel), the majority of people entitled to receiving 28−40 hours
of personal care took up less care than the lower bound of 28 h
(the median individual using about 25 h), and the same observation
holds for patients entitled to less personal care (other panels) and
other types of home care.
There is much variation in how much of the home care that
someone is eligible for is used (Table 2). What share is used varies
across types of care and by the amount that the person is eligible
for. For instance, median use is 1 h for individuals who  are eligi-
ble for 0−2 h of personal care per week. That is, for this group, use
is equal to 100 % of the average of 0 and 2 (the upper and lower
bound of the category). Yet, median use by individuals who are
eligible for 10−13 h is only 8.75 h of care (76 % of 11.5). Further-
more, the proportion of the sample for whom eligibility is binding,
i.e. who use between 90–100 % of the total amount of hours they
are eligible for, ranges between only 10−20 % of the population. A
small proportion (3–5 %) of the home care users receives more care
than the maximum admitted amount, which suggests that in prac-
tice the maximum is not always strictly applied. Figures for the
other types of home care (i.e. nursing, individual assistance and
group assistance) show highly similar patterns as the ones pre-
5
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4 and who used less than 125 % of the maximum number of hours. The median is
n kind. The results for individuals eligible for more than 40 h of personal care per
ented here for personal care and are available through the online
upplement.
The regression analyses reveal that the take-up ratio not only
iffers by the type of home care and the number of the hours one is
ligible for, but also across subgroups of users, and that the overall
eans hide substantial heterogeneity (Table 3). For example, the
ake-up ratio increases with age, is lower for men, and for individ-
als with children, with a spouse, and with somatic condition, and
or those who are living in rural areas and are not of foreign descent.
here is also regional variation. For example, for personal care there
s a difference of 19 percentage points between the regions with the
ighest and the lowest average take-up ratio, i.e. an 11-minute dif-
erence per hour of care for which someone is eligible. These results
uggest that various subgroups in the population experience differ-
nt barriers to use home care, or that these subgroups are treated
ifferently by independent assessors.
There are only a few subgroups for which the predicted take-
p ratio is close to 1 and hence the restrictions from the eligibility
ssessment may  be binding (e.g. those from Turkish descent) and
hose are small in size. In sum, for virtually all types of care, all
opulation subgroups, and all regions patients use less home care
han they are eligible for, indicating that for the majority of home
are users the restrictions on the number of hours imposed by the
ssessor may  not be effective in constraining demand for publicly
nanced home care.. Discussion
There are several potential explanations for the low uptake of
ublic LTC benefits among eligible people. First of all, other public
ARTICLE ING ModelHEAP-4333; No. of Pages 6
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Table  3
Regression results.
Take-up ratio personal carea
Age 18−64 −0.051 (0.001)**
Age 65−69 −0.036 (0.001)**
Age 70−74 −0.021 (0.001)**
Age 75−79 −0.013 (0.001)**
Age 80−84 Reference category
Age 85−89 0.007 (0.001)**
Age 90−94 0.019 (0.001)**
Man  −0.016 (0.000)**
Woman Reference category
Deceased before 1 January 2014 0.009 (0.001)**
Survived until 1 January 2014 Reference category
Time to death, in months 0.000 (0.000)
Not of foreign descent Reference category
Foreign descent: Western countries 0.090 (0.003)**
Foreign descent: Turkey 0.135 (0.003)**
Foreign descent: Morocco 0.028 (0.002)**
Foreign descent: Suriname 0.015 (0.004)**
Foreign descent: Netherlands Antilles and
Aruba
0.001 (0.001)
No Children Reference category
Children −0.008 (0.001)**
Number of children 0.001 (0.000)**
Household size 0.000 (0.000)
No spouse/spouse lives in another
household
Reference category
Spouse lives in the same household −0.038 (0.000)**
Municipality: very strongly urbanized Reference category
Municipality: strongly urbanized −0.024 (0.001)**
Municipality: moderately urbanized −0.029 (0.001)**
Municipality: little urbanized −0.031 (0.001)**
Municipality: rural −0.032 (0.001)**
Somatic condition Reference category
Psychogeriatric condition 0.042 (0.001)**
Psychiatric condition 0.030 (0.001)**
Physical disability 0.051 (0.001)**
Mental disability 0.036 (0.002)**
Sensory disability 0.017 (0.002)**
Health care expenditures in previous year
(in  1000 euro)
0.000 (0.000)**
Intercept 0.890 (0.002)**
Regionsb Yes
Timeb Yes
Amount of careb Yes
Income: 5% categoriesb Yes
Number of observations 2,050,715
Note: results for other types of home care are available upon request.
a Individuals who used at least some care provided in kind only.
b Both regressions included 31 indicators for single-payer regions and 12 indica-
tors for the second through the 13th four-week period. In addition, the regression
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Dfor personal care contained 9 indicators to control for the number of hours the indi-
vidual is eligible for and 19 indicators for the lowest 19 5 % categories based on
standardized household income.
policies such as copayments and regional budget restrictions may
partly explain this. A potential consequence of a longer period of
tight regional budgets is a constrained supply side, resulting in a
lack of access to services by patients. Second, the assessment rules
or the assessor’s interpretation may  be too generous. Third, infor-
mal  care, which is a close substitute for formal home care in some
cases, may  play a role. Further research is needed to understand the
role of each of the causes of the discrepancy between the amount
of care people actually use and are eligible for.
The limited impact of independent needs assessment on LTC use
raises the question about its effectiveness, at least within the Dutch
context. If moral hazard and supplier induced demand are effec-
tively counteracted by budgetary restrictions and co-payments,
independent needs assessment may  only be necessary on the
extensive margin to prevent non-eligible people from using LTC
altogether, but not on the intensive margin. Thus, given the few
users whose LTC use is close to the maximum, it may  be sufficient
to assess the type of care needed but not the number of hours per
t
s
a
f
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eek, while leaving the allocation of the budget among users to the
ayers or the providers. At the extensive margin independent needs
ssessment in the Dutch LTC system may  effectively block some
eople from using care altogether. It is not clear, however, to what
xtent and for which people the independent needs assessment
oses barriers to access care. To investigate this, data are required
n which applications are rejected, but these data are currently not
vailable for research.
A reform of Dutch system LTC financing that was implemented
n 2015 may  shed further light on the impact of independent needs
ssessment on LTC use. As part of the reform, most home care
as  transferred from the public LTC insurance scheme to either
he public health insurance scheme (personal and nursing care)
r the municipalities (social support and personal assistance with
ctivities of daily life). Consequently, for personal and nursing care
ndependent needs assessors have been replaced by providers,
hereas for social support and personal assistance they have been
eplaced by municipalities. The effect of abolishing the independent
eeds assessment cannot be separated from the effects of other
arts of the 2015 reform [20]. Yet, our finding that independent
eeds assessment had a limited impact on the intensive margin of
ome care use before the reform suggests that abolishing this may
ot have had a substantial effect on the use by existing users.
Finally, the limited effect of needs assessment on the intensive
argin of home care use in the Netherlands also raises questions
bout the effectiveness of the independent assessment in other
ountries, where the demand and supply of LTC are often more
estricted through other measures [18]. Furthermore, our findings
uggest that setting objective eligibility criteria is not enough for
nsuring that the actual use follows the same rules, as we find that
on-take-up is considerable and the extent of non-take-up varies
cross subgroups in the population.
. Conclusion
Comprehensive LTC insurance may  give rise to moral hazard and
upplier-induced demand. A strategy that often used for publicly
nanced LTC – but not for other types of health care – is to organize
n independent needs assessment. Such an independent assess-
ent may  counter moral hazard and supplier-induced demand by
etermining which types and which amount of LTC a person really
eeds.
Although the extent of moral hazard and supplier-induced
emand in publicly financed LTC cannot be established, we are able
o investigate whether independent needs assessment effectively
estricts LTC use at the intensive margin. If independent needs
ssessment does not impose a binding constraint on LTC use, it is
ighly unlikely that it reduces moral hazard and supplier-induced
emand among those who are eligible for care. Hence, this would
emove an important reason for organizing the independent needs
ssessment.
We find that independent needs assessment does not seem to be
ffective in constraining publicly financed LTC use once people are
onsidered eligible for receiving care. The uptake of the LTC benefits
aries across subgroups, but virtually all subgroups use only part of
he LTC for which they are eligible. The variation in uptake is associ-
ted with the patient’s personal and household characteristics and
is or her region of residence.
eclaration of competing interest
Part of the research was done while Pieter Bakx performed con-
ract research for the CPB. Pieter Bakx and Erik Schut acknowledge
upport through the NETSPAR grant on “Optimal saving and insur-
nce for old age: the role of public long-term care insurance”. These
unding sources were not involved in the research.
 ING Model
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[19] CBS. Monitor langdurige zorg; 2018 [Accessed on 12 June 2019] mlzstat-
line.cbs.nl.
[20] Bakx P, Garcia-Gomez P, Rellstab S, Schut F, van Doorslaer E. Hervorming lang-
durige zorg: trends in het gebruik van verpleging en verzorging. Netspar DesignARTICLEHEAP-4333; No. of Pages 6
P. Bakx et al. 
Acknowledgement
The authors thank Peter Alders, Adam Elbourne, Esther Mot,
Marielle Non, Johan Polder and Wouter Vermeulen for com-
ments. In this article we use non-public microdata from Statistics
Netherlands. A previous version of the paper is published as CPB
Discussion Paper 327.
References
[1] Arrow K. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American
Economic Review 1963;53(5):941–73.
[2] Bakx P, Chernichovsky D, Paolucci F, Schokkaert E, Trottmann M,  Wasem J, Schut
F.  Demand-side strategies to deal with moral hazard in public insurance for
long-term care. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy 2015;20(3):170–6.
[3] Goncalves J, Weaver F. Home care, hospitalizations and doctor visits. University
of  Geneva working paper series, no. 14-09-5. Geneva: University of Geneva;
2014.
[4] Tamiya N, Noguchi H, Nishi A, Reich M,  Ikegami N, Hashimoto H, Shibuya K,
Kawachi I, Campbell J. Population ageing and wellbeing: lessons from Japan’s
long-term care insurance policy. Lancet 2011;378(9797):1183–92.
[5] Willemé P, Geerts J, Cantillon B, Mussche N. Long-term care financing in
Belgium. In: Costa-Font J, Courbage C, editors. Financing long-term care in
Europe. Institutions, markets and models. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan; 2012.[6] CIZ. Trendrapportage landelijke indicatiestelling AWBZ 2009. Driebergen: CIZ;
2010.
[7] Arrighi Y, Davin B, Trannoy A, Ventelou B. The non-take up of long-term care
benefit in France: a pecuniary motive? Health Policy 2015, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.07.003.
6 PRESS
Health Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
[8] Guthmuller S, Jusot F, Wittwer J. Improving takeup of health insurance
program: a social experiment in France. Journal of Human Resources
2014;49(1):167–94.
[9] Prendergast C. The limits of bureaucratic efficiency. Journal of Political Economy
2003;111(5):929–58.
10] CBS. Gezondheid en zorg in cijfers 2014. The Hague: CBS; 2015.
11] Mot  E. The Dutch system of long-term care. Centraal plan bureau document,
no.  204. The Hague: CPB; 2010.
12] RMO. Indicatiestelling: omstreden toegang tot zorg. The Hague: RMO; 2010.
13] Lindeboom M, van der Klaauw B, Vriend S. Audit rates and compliance: a field
experiment in care provision. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
2016;131:160–73.
14] Rijksoverheid. Beleidsregels indicatiestelling AWBZ 2012; 2011 [Accessed
on 12 June 2019] http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0030849/geldigheidsdatum
02-01-2012.
15] Rijksoverheid. Beleidsregels indicatiestelling wlz 2015; 2014 [Accessed on
12  June 2019] http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0036073/geldigheidsdatum
23-04-2015.
16] Diepstraten M,  Douven R, Wouterse B. Can your house keep you out of a nursing
home? Health Economics 2020;29(5):540–53.
17] CVZ. Wachtlijstonderzoek AWBZ. Factoren die van invloed zijn op de betrouw-
baarheid van wachtlijstinformatie. Diemen: CVZ; 2013.
18] OECD. Help wanted? Providing and paying for long-term care. OECD health
policy studies. Paris: OECD; 2011.Paper 141; 2020.
